In the crowded translation tech space, Hızlıçeviri wasn't just another startup—it was a revenue-generating machine with 17 employees and $2.4M in the bank. Then, in a single headline, they announced their own demise. This is a post-mortem on a company that built a business only to dismantle it.

"They weren't killed by the market. They were killed by the product."

The technical stack (Tailwind CSS, Cloudflare, HSTS) reveals a modern, cost-effective frontend, but it's all surface-level. There's no evidence of advanced AI translation models, no API integrations, no ecosystem. This was a lightweight wrapper around translation services, not a defensible moat. When the market shifted toward integrated AI solutions (DeepL, Google Translate API), Hızlıçeviri's value proposition evaporated.

• Traffic was already dead: 415 monthly visits is a rounding error, not a business.
• Brand identity was nonexistent: Their top search term was literally a typo.
• The business model was flawed: $2.4M revenue with 17 people is a service company, not a scalable tech product.
• They saw the writing on the wall: 'Hizmetlerimizi Sonlandırıyoruz' (We're terminating our services) is a clean exit, not a pivot.